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Abstract: It is widely recognised that ‘the individual’ was prioritised by the Thatcher 
governments. However there has been little analysis by historians of exactly how the Thatcher 
government conceptualised ‘the individual’. In this paper we attempt to remedy this deficiency 
by undertaking a case study of a key Thatcherite social policy reform: the introduction of 
‘Personal Pensions’. This approach allows us to understand the position of ‘the individual’ on the 
functional level of Thatcherite policymaking. In doing so we argue that there was no coherent or 
fixed Thatcherite concept of the individual. Instead we identify three fundamental tensions: (i) 
should individuals be capitalists or consumers; (ii) were they rational or irrational; and (iii) should 
they be risk-taking entrepreneurs or prudent savers? This reflected, in part, conflicts within the 
diverse tapestry of post-war neoliberal thought. We demonstrate in this paper that these tensions 
undermined the Thatcher governments’ original attempt to create a society of entrepreneurial 
investor capitalists, which in turn cemented their preference for simply maximising individual 
freedom of choice within a competitive – yet tightly regulated – market environment. 
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I 
The policies of Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative governments between 1979 and 1990 are 
popularly understood as the expression of ‘Thatcherism’. This term remains, as ever, an ill-
defined concept subject to extensive debate.2 Though some analysts have emphasised the 
material drivers of Thatcherism (either as a programme for saving capitalism following the crisis 
of the 1970s, or as effective election-winning statecraft), the debate amongst historians has 
primarily focused on its ideological character.3 In particular, historians have attempted to identify 
the ideas which influenced and shaped the Thatcher governments. Thatcherism has been 
variously identified as having originated either in Margaret Thatcher’s personal preferences and 
biases; in the ideas and traditions of the Conservative Party; or in the transnational intellectual 
and political movement of ‘neoliberalism’. 
Peter Riddell has argued that ‘Thatcherism’ was simply a reflection of Thatcher’s personal 
instincts, which amounted to  
 
…a series of moral values and an approach to leadership rather than an ideology… 
[an] expression of Mrs Thatcher's upbringing in Grantham, her background of hard 
work and family responsibility, ambition and postponed satisfaction, duty and 
patriotism.4 
 
For Eric Evans, Thatcher’s convictions could be defined more specifically as  
 
[opposition to] state interference with individual freedom; state initiatives that 
encourage an ethos of ‘dependency’; woolly consensuality; high levels of taxation; 
                                                 
2 Ben Jackson and Robert Saunders, ‘Introduction: Varieties of Thatcherism’, in Ben Jackson and Robert Saunders 
eds., Making Thatcher’s Britain, (Cambridge, 2012), pp. 1-22. 
3 Ian Gough, The Political Economy of the Welfare State (London, 1979); Jim Bulpitt, ‘The Discipline of the New 
Democracy: Mrs Thatcher's Domestic Statecraft’, Political Studies, 34: 1 (1986), pp.19-39. 
4 Peter Riddell, The Thatcher Government, (Oxford, 1985), p. 7. 
3 
 
the propensity of both organised labour and entrenched professional interests to 
distort market forces; and a reluctance to be ‘pushed around’ personally or as a 
nation state.5 
For Thatcher herself, these values amounted to a conscious rejection of the post-war 
‘consensus.’ That rejection not only distanced her from Labour Party socialism but also from the 
governing elite of the post-war Tory party who had supposedly accommodated themselves with 
a large State, a mixed-economy, and a sectional trade union movement.6 For these so-called Tory 
‘wets’, Thatcherism represented an anti-Conservative commitment to excessive individualism 
and extreme liberal economic doctrine which was not in keeping with the party’s traditions of 
gradualism and the championing of national community. Ian Gilmour, her most vocal Tory 
critic, alleged that she was not a true Conservative but simply a reconstructed nineteenth-century 
Manchester liberal.7 E.H.H. Green, however, challenged Gilmour’s view of Thatcherism as an 
alien ideology, and asserted that it was in fact a product of ‘long-standing arguments and trends’ 
in the ‘subculture’ of the Conservative Party.8 He argued that, like Thatcher, the post-war Tory 
party was instinctively resistant to statist solutions wherever possible, and unified in its desire to 
build a ‘property owning democracy.’ 9 
An alternative interpretation views Thatcherism as the local British expression of 
‘neoliberalism’ – a trans-national intellectual and political project which emerged in the middle of 
the twentieth century.10 The ‘neoliberal thought collective’ (to use Plehwe and Mirowski’s 
                                                 
5 Eric J. Evans, Thatcher and Thatcherism, 3rd edn, (London, 2013), p. 3. 
6 Margaret Thatcher, Downing Street Years (London, 1993), pp. 6-8. 
7 Ian Gilmour, Dancing with Dogma : Britain under Thatcherism,  (London, 1992), p. 9. 
8 E. H. H. Green, Thatcher,  (London, 2006), p. 53. 
9 Matthew Francis, ‘‘A Crusade to Enfranchise the Many’: Thatcherism and the 'Property-Owning Democracy’, 
Twentieth Century British History, 23: 2 (2012), 276-79; Stephen Evans, ‘The Not So Odd Couple: Margaret 
Thatcher and One Nation Conservatism’, Contemporary British History, 23: 1 (2009), pp. 108-9; Aled Davies, 
‘‘Right to Buy’: The Development of a Conservative Housing Policy, 1945-1980’, Contemporary British History, 27: 
4 (2013), pp. 421-444. See also the literature on the post-war consensus, e.g. Harriet Jones and Michael Kandiah, 
eds., The Myth of Consensus: new views on British History, 1945-64, (Basingtoke, 1996). 
10 See, for example, Jamie Peck and Adam Tickell, ‘Conceptualising Neoliberalism, Thinking Thatcherism’, in Helga 
Leitner, Jamie Peck, and Eric S. Sheppard, eds., Contesting Neoliberalism: Urban Frontiers, (New York, 2007), pp. 26-
50. 
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terminology) consisted of a diverse range of intellectuals and institutions committed to the 
overthrow of the post-war social democratic order in defence of individual liberty.11 In the 
British context, the relationship between neoliberalism and the political project of the 
Conservative Party under Margaret Thatcher has primarily focused on the way in which 
neoliberal ideas entered British politics via dedicated ‘think-tanks’, the most notable of which 
were the Institute of Economic Affairs and the Tory-affiliated Centre for Policy Studies.12  It is 
dangerous to make too easy an elision between Thatcherism and neoliberalism and easy to 
overestimate its coherence but, as Daniel Stedman-Jones noted, it is often accepted that whilst 
‘Thatcherism’ may have developed in an unplanned way from its initial ‘monetarist’ economic 
strategy, ‘it came to include many other measures that were inspired by neoliberal theories.’13 
Attempting to identify ‘crisply unambiguous, essentialist definitions’ of neoliberalism has 
become, according to Jamie Peck, ‘the bane of many a political lexicographer.’14 In general, 
efforts to understand neoliberalism fall into two categories. The first is a history of ideas 
approach which has sought to understand the development of neoliberal thought in the 
twentieth century.15 The key contribution of this literature, other than to reveal the activism and 
impressive organisation of individuals and groups associated with the Mont Pelerin Society, has 
been to demonstrate that there was never a unified ‘neoliberal’ ideology. In particular, there was 
a tension between the early ‘ordoliberal’ tradition which emerged in Germany during the 1940s, 
and the later priorities of the ‘Chicago school’. Where the former sought to use the State to break 
                                                 
11 Dieter Plehwe, ‘Introduction’, in Philip Mirowski and Dieter Plehwe, eds., The Road from Mont Pèlerin : The Making 
of the Neoliberal Thought Collective, (Cambridge, MA, 2009), pp. 14-15. 
12 Ben Jackson, ‘The Think Tank Archipelago: Thatcherism and Neo-Liberalism’, in Making Thatcher's Britain, pp. 43-
61; Richard Cockett, Thinking the Unthinkable: Think-Tanks and the Economic Counter-Revolution, 1931-1983,  
(London, 1994); Radhika Desai, ‘Second-Hand Dealers in Ideas: Think-Tanks and Thatcherite Hegemony’, New 
Left Review, I: 203, (1994), pp. 27-64; Brian Harrison, ‘Mrs Thatcher and the Intellectuals’, Twentieth Century British 
History, 5: 2 (1994), pp. 206-45. 
13 Daniel Stedman Jones, Masters of the Universe: Hayek, Friedman, and the Birth of Neoliberal Politics, (Princeton, NJ, 
2014), p. 261. 
14 Jamie Peck, Constructions of Neoliberal Reason, (Oxford, 2010), p. 8. 
15 Plehwe and Mirowski, eds., The Road from Mont Pelerin; Ben Jackson, ‘At the Origins of Neo-liberalism: the free 
economy and the strong state, 1930 – 1947’, The Historical Journal, 53: 1 (2010), pp. 129-151; Rachel S. Turner, 
Neo-liberal Ideology: history, concepts and policies, (Edinburgh, 2008). 
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all private monopolies and to create entrepreneurial individuals through interventionist social and 
economic policies, the latter sought to liberate innately rational and self-interested individuals 
from the shackles of state bureaucracy through the maximisation of choice within a free 
market.16 
The second approach to analysing neoliberalism has been developed by sociologists 
working in a Foucauldian tradition. This approach develops Michel Foucault’s concept of 
‘governmentality’ which he introduced in his lectures at the College de France in 1978.17 As part 
of his attempt to understand the exercise of power in liberal societies, Foucault identified a form 
of ‘neoliberal governmentality’ in which individuals are required to take responsibility for their 
own self-government. From this perspective, neoliberalism is understood as a process of 
subjectification, in which the individual is constructed according to specific moral, ethical, and 
behavioural norms. According to Thomas Lemke, in his summary of Foucault’s argument: 
 
[t]he key feature of the neo-liberal rationality is the congruence it endeavours to 
achieve between a responsible and moral individual and an economic-rational 
actor. It aspires to construct prudent subjects whose moral quality is based on the 
fact that they rationally assess the costs and benefits of a certain act as opposed to 
other alternative acts. As the choice of options for action is, or so the neo-liberal 
notion of rationality would have it, the expression of free will on the basis of a self-
determined decision, the consequences of the action are borne by the subject 
alone, who is also solely responsible for them.18 
 
                                                 
16 Werner Bonefeld, ‘Freedom and the Strong State: On German Ordoliberalism’, New Political Economy, 17: 5 (2012), 
pp. 633-656; Robert Van Horn and Philip Mirowski, ‘The Rise of the Chicago School of Economics’, in The 
Road from Mont Pelerin, pp. 139-180. 
17 Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College de France, 1978-1979, (London, 2008). 
18 Thomas Lemke, ‘‘The Birth of Bio-Politics’: Michel Foucault’s lectures at the College de France on neo-liberal 
governmentality’, Economy and Society, 30: 2 (2001), p. 201. 
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This ‘governmentality’ literature provides an important interpretive framework for understanding 
neoliberalism, but it is not entirely satisfactory. There is a degree of imprecision in the model of 
the neoliberal liberal subject, particularly concerning whether the individual in neoliberalism is – 
or ought be – a  ‘consumer’, an ‘investor’, a ‘worker’, or a ‘saver’, etc. For example, Rose claims 
that ‘citizenship is to be manifested through the free exercise of personal choice among a variety 
of marketed options’.19 Yet Langley emphasises the centrality of ‘investment’ as a neoliberal 
‘technology of the self’.20 It may be possible to understand both the consumer and investor 
characteristics under the same umbrella of ‘self-responsibility’, however the elision of the two 
does suggest that more work is required in order to pinpoint a more specific and rigorous 
understanding of the ‘neoliberal subject’.21 Another key question produced by the 
governmentality literature concerns the sources of neoliberal subjectification. There is a 
reluctance by those working within the Foucauldian tradition to consider the influence of ‘high-
politics’, and a much greater emphasis is placed on social relations, disciplinary institutions, and 
the production of knowledge.22 This has left a gap between historians (who have concerned 
themselves with uncovering the ideological and material factors driving the State-centric shift to 
neoliberalism) and the Foucauldian approach which, as Birch as noted, does not attempt to 
explain causation.23 
 
                                                 
19 Nikolas Rose, Governing the Soul: the shaping of the private self, 2nd ed., (London, 1999), pp. 230-231. 
20 Paul Langley, ‘The making of investor subjects in Anglo-American pensions’ Environment and Planning D: Space and 
Society, 24: 6 (2006), pp. 919-934. 
21 Lemke, ‘The Birth of Bio-Politics’, pp. 201-2. 
22 Rose, Governing the Soul, 1989; Nikolas Rose and Peter Miller, ‘Political Power beyond the State: Problematics of 
Government’, British Journal of Sociology, 43: 2 (1992), pp. 173-205; Nikolas Rose, Pat O’Malley, and Mariana 
Valverde, ‘Governmentality’, Annual Review of Law and Social Science, 2 (2006), pp. 90-91.  
23 Kean Birch, ‘Neoliberalism: The Whys and Wherefores… and Future Directions’, Sociology Compass, 9: 7 (2015), p. 
575; as an exception, see Nikolas Rose, ‘Governing ‘advanced’ liberal democracies’, in Andrew Barry, Thomas 
Osborne, Nikolas Rose, eds., Foucault and Political Reason: Liberalism, Neo-Liberalism, and Rationalities of Government, 
(London, 1996), p. 52. 
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Recent work by Florence Sutcliffe-Braithwaite has begun to develop more complex models for 
understanding the interactions between neoliberalism and Thatcherism.24 For example, in regards 
to welfare payments, she argues that rather than representing a monolithic neoliberalism, the 
Thatcher government pursued a very specific strand of thought within neoliberalism and 
combined this with traditional Conservative values. This blending process often involved the 
rejection of some policy options promoted by influential neoliberals (such as Milton Friedman’s 
proposal of a ‘negative income tax’).25 Furthermore, Sutcliffe-Braithwaite demonstrates the 
centrality to the Thatcherite project of attempting to reform the moral and behavioural norms of 
British society. Associated in particular with Sir Keith Joseph, and encouraged by the sociological 
analyses of embourgeoisement which had developed since the late 1950s, Thatcherites sought to 
rejuvenate Britain by spreading ‘bourgeois virtues’ (self-discipline; self-help; deferred-
gratification) to each individual. The intention, according to Joseph, was for these values to be 
‘internalised by all’.26 Indeed, this ideal is reflected in one of Thatcher’s most famous aphorisms – 
‘economics are the method; the object is to change the heart and soul’.27 This is echoed in Shirley 
Robin Letwin’s interpretation of Thatcherism as a project designed to imbue the public with 
‘vigorous virtues’, and in turn supports the Foucauldian analysis of neoliberalism as primarily 
acting upon individual subjectivity.28  
Nonetheless, despite the contributions of Sutcliffe-Braithwaite and Letwin, the position 
of ‘the individual’ within Thatcherism remains under-analysed by historians. It is evident, 
however, that if the innovative Foucauldian approach to understanding ‘neoliberalism’ is to be 
integrated within the existing well-established literature on Thatcherism, historians must focus 
much more closely on position of ‘the individual’ within the political project. The following 
                                                 
24 Sutcliffe-Braithwaite’s work could be said to build upon Andrew Gamble’s analysis of the tensions within 
Thatcherism in: Andrew Gamble, The Free Economy and the Strong State (Basingstoke, 1988) 
25 Florence Sutcliffe-Braithwaite, ‘Neo-liberalism and Morality in the Making of Thatcherite Social Policy’, The 
Historical Journal, 55: 2 (2012), pp. 497-520. 
26 Ibid., 516. 
27 Ronald Butt, ‘Mrs Thatcher: the first two years’, Sunday Times, 1 May 1981. 
28 Shirely Robin Letwin, The Anatomy of Thatcherism, (London, 1992). 
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analysis attempts to achieve this by examining the Thatcherite concept of ‘the individual’, and the 
Thatcher governments’ agenda for reform of the individual, via a case study of the development 
and introduction of a major social policy innovation: the ‘Personal Pension’. 
 
II 
In the 1980s, Conservative governments reshaped the landscape of British pensions, 
both private and public, through an array of legislative changes. Their most obviously 
revolutionary change was to introduce a new system of individualised ‘personal pensions’ in the 
1986 Finance Act. Thereby, in combination with the Social Security Act of the same year, the 
government sought to pass to the individual the responsibility for ensuring an income in old age 
over-and-above the minimalist basic state pension and to break with collective provision, 
whether by the state or by employers via an ‘occupational pension’ scheme. In the process, the 
architects of change had hoped also to personalise investment in British firms by turning the 
country into a nation of individual pension fund investors. The introduction of the new personal 
pensions was therefore explicitly about rebalancing away from the collective to the individual 
and, as such, provides a perfect opportunity to study how neoliberal conceptualisations of ‘the 
individual’ informed the development of policy. 
On entering government in 1979 the Conservatives inherited a pensions structure 
comprised of two pillars. The first of these pillars - the basic state pension - provided a minimum 
income in retirement via a system of national insurance. In accordance with the original 
intentions of William Beveridge, this limited retirement income was supplemented by a second 
pillar of private pension arrangements, although this had come to be supplemented by a state-
run alternative. Almost all private pension arrangements for workers other than the self-
employed took the form of occupational pensions, in which employers and employees 
contributed to a pension fund which was managed by the former (though often by an insurance 
company working on the employer’s behalf). Occupational scheme membership had risen from 
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6.2 million in 1953 to 11.8 million in 1979 - an increase from 29 per cent to 51 per cent of the 
total workforce.29 Widening occupational pension scheme membership had resulted in a 
substantial growth in the size of pension funds (the accumulation of invested pension 
contributions), from an estimated total real market value (in 1978 prices) of £8.3 billion in 1957 
to £31 billion in 1978.30 These savings were invested on the London Stock Exchange on behalf 
of their members, resulting in a massive ‘institutionalisation’ of ownership and investment in the 
British economy. By 1981 pension funds and insurance companies were recorded as the nominal 
owners of almost half of all shareholdings on the London Stock Exchange.31 For the remainder 
of the workforce not enrolled in a workplace scheme, the State provided a State Earnings 
Related Pensions Scheme (SERPS) – introduced in 1978 as a development of earlier, much less-
generous, earnings related state provision that had acted as a ‘backstop’ to the private sector. 
SERPS did not invest in the market, it was a ‘pay-as-you-go-scheme’ in which contributions were 
recycled through the national insurance fund to pay present-day benefits, but it did offer an 
earnings-related top up to the basic state pension that would in combination provide to a worker 
retiring after forty years of service a pension of about fifty per cent of their income (as many 
occupational schemes did). In short, by the time the Conservatives took office in 1979 a second 
pillar of British pensions had come into being that covered all employed workers and which 
embodied a productive partnership between the state and employers. 
The consensus that had been constructed around a mixed-economy second pensions 
pillar did not survive long for as soon as they were elected in 1979 the Conservatives broke with 
it, not least because they decried the future costs to the state of promises embodied in SERPS.  
In 1984 an inquiry into the UK pensions system was set up under the Secretary of State for 
Health and Social Services, Norman Fowler. The inquiry had a dual focus: evaluating the long-
term financial sustainability of SERPS; and considering the feasibility of proposals to introduce 
                                                 
29 Joan C. Brown and Stephen Small, Occupational Benefits as Social Security, (London:, 1985), p. 138, p. 153. 
30 Cmd. 7937, Report: Committee to Review the Functioning of Financial Institutions, (1980), Appendix Table 3.50. 
31 John Plender, That’s the Way the Money Goes: Financial Institutions and Your Savings, (London, 1982), pp .40-42.  
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‘Personal Pensions’. This latter idea had originated as a response to the so-called ‘early leaver 
problem’ for occupational pensions, in which employees who changed jobs (and been forced to 
leave their accrued pension contributions with their previous employer) saw the value of their 
pension savings eroded by high rates of inflation. A radical solution to this problem was 
suggested by the right-wing think-tank Centre for Policy Studies (CPS) in 1983. Proposed by 
Nigel Vinson (a businessman and founding member of the CPS) and Phillip Chappell (a 
merchant banker), their idea was to enable all employees to take responsibility for their own 
pension in the form of a ‘personal and portable pension’ (PPP). They argued that the most 
effective means to overcome the ‘grave injustice on those who change jobs’ was for pension 
rights to be personalised (rather than aggregated in large occupational funds) and fully 
transferable when moving jobs.32 This idea was given enthusiastic backing by the Prime Minister 
and her advisers in Downing Street, and so Fowler was tasked with finding a way to make it 
work. Following an inquiry which, as we will see, revealed only limited external support for 
‘Personal Pensions’, the reform was introduced as part of the 1986 Social Security Act. 
In the process of implementing pension reform, however, policy makers were forced to 
confront contradictions within the ideas that underlay the proposals for that reform. Most 
significantly, if this was a policy that individualised pensions, how exactly was the individual 
conceived? Was the typical individual making provision for their income in retirement to be an 
investor-capitalist or a consumer in the market for financial products; were their decisions likely 
to be rational or irrational; were they to be a risk-taking entrepreneur or a prudent saver? 
 
III 
As Letwin and Sutcliffe-Braithwaite have both argued, the Thatcher governments sought 
to reform the moral and behavioural norms of individuals within British society. However, the 
                                                 
32 Centre for Policy Studies, ‘Personal and Portable Pensions – for all’, (April 1983) 
http://www.cps.org.uk/publications/reports/personal-and-portable-pensions-for-all/, [Last accessed: 11 March 
2017]. 
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development of the ‘Personal Pensions’ policy demonstrates that there was no fixed vision of a 
prototypical Thatcherite individual. (Except in one respect – gender, for despite a marked rise in 
female participation in the labour force in the 1980s, and despite the fact that women had much 
poorer pension coverage than men (an issue that had been central to the reform of pensions in 
the 1970s), the architects of pension reforms in the 1980s routinely assumed that ‘the individual’ 
they were discussing was a man. Ironically, this was exactly the ‘male breadwinner model’ which 
had underpinned the Beveridge plan in the 1940s).  Indeed, the conceptualisation of the 
individual by the architects of change was characterised by fundamental tensions and 
inconsistencies. The foremost of these concerned whether the aim should be to make individuals 
into investor-capitalists, or to create a society of free consumers.  
The 1986 Social Security Act gave all individuals the right to leave their occupational 
pension scheme, or the State-run SERPS equivalent, and transfer their pension savings into a 
‘personal pension’. In doing so, individuals were afforded the freedom to choose from a variety 
of private providers who would be responsible for investing those savings on their behalf. 
However, this was not the model envisaged by Nigel Vinson and Phillip Chappell when they first 
proposed the CPS’ idea of individualising pensions. They wanted to provide a ‘constructive 
alternative philosophy to socialism’ which could ‘spread wealth, decision making and self-
fulfilment’.33 ‘Personal pensions’ would create a ‘capital owning society’ by challenging what 
Vinson described as the ‘increasingly insidious concentration of wealth in the hands of financial 
institutions.’34 One could argue, as Margaret Thatcher had done in 1977, that ‘the great 
occupational pension and life insurance funds’ represented a ‘kind of people’s capitalism’.35 Yet 
for Vinson and Chappell, the key issue was that the institutionalisation of savings and investment 
                                                 
33 Hugh Thomas and Alfred Sherman, ‘Centre for Policy Studies: Reports of Study Groups 1980-81’, February 1981, 
Margaret Thatcher Foundation website [hereafter MTF]: http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/121408, 
121408.  
34 Nigel Vinson to Sir Russell Smith, 26 October 1983; the National Archives [hereafter TNA]: T 530/77,; Lord 
Thomas of Swynnerton and Alfred Sherman, ‘Centre for Policy Studies: Reports of Study Groups 1982-83’, 
February 1983, http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/131497, MTF 131497. 
35 Margaret Thatcher, ‘Speech to the Zurich Economic Society: The New Renaissance’, 14 March 1977, 
http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/103336, MTF 103336. 
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obscured the individual’s relationship with their accrued personal wealth. Institutional ownership 
meant that there was no ‘personal identification’ with the assets indirectly owned by the 
individual. Such ownership ‘at second-hand’ was not, claimed Vinson, ‘ownership in the 
motivational sense’.36 As Vinson informed the government’s pensions inquiry in 1984: 
 
‘…unless some pension changes are introduced now to restore a greater sense of 
personal ownership, simplicity, and genuine involvement in the underlying asset, the 
nation’s wealth, increasingly dominated by retirement provision, will be regarded as 
nobody’s money’.37  
 
According to Vinson, the goal should be ‘to turn “nobody’s money” into “somebody’s 
money.”’38 This was necessary because ‘…only if individuals participate directly in the creation of 
wealth can they understand the benefits which it brings to society at large.’39  
The CPS agenda was to help ensure the long-term survival and reinvigoration of 
capitalism by turning passive pension-savers into active investor-capitalists. Not only would the 
personalisation of pensions make individuals more aware of their own personal wealth, the CPS 
argued, but it would educate them in the operation of the capitalist system. Through their direct 
personal involvement in the wealth accumulation which was to support them in old-age, 
individuals would come to understand the actual ‘wealth creation’ process and the utmost 
necessity of profitable enterprise.40 Vinson told the Fowler inquiry that for people to ‘understand 
                                                 
36 Nigel Vinson, ‘IV. Personal Capital Formation’, in Thomas and Sherman, ‘Centre for Policy Studies: Reports of 
Study Groups 1980-81’, February 1981, MTF 121408; ‘Centre for Policy Studies: Reports of Study Groups 1982-
83’, February 1983, MTF 131497; Vinson to Sir Russell Smith, 26 October 1983, TNA: T 530/77. 
37 Nigel Vinson and Philip Chappell to Nick Montagu, 9 February 1984, TNA: BN 147/27. 
38 Nigel Vinson, ‘Draft Statement to be issued by Centre for Policy Studies if and when the government announces 
the option of Personal and Portable Pensions for all’, July 1984, TNA: BN 147/10. 
39 Philip Chappell and Nigel Vinson, ‘Owners All: a proposal for Personal Investment Pools’, CPS: Policy Challenge, 
(October, 1985), http://www.cps.org.uk/publications/reports/owners-all/. [Last accessed: 11 March 2017].  
40 Centre for Policy Studies, ‘Personal and Portable Pensions, Evidence to the Retirement Provision Inquiry’, 6 
January 1984, TNA: T 530/128.  
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the process of wealth creation’ they must have a ‘first-hand knowledge of it.’41 This was 
supported by others, most notably Walter Goldsmith (Director General of the Institute of 
Directors), for whom the personal pension idea offered the opportunity to imbue the public with 
capitalist values. Britain was, according Goldsmith, ‘a capitalist country with too few capitalists’, 
and there was a need for ‘more knowledge about how to use money and to make money’.42 
According to Adam Ridley (political advisor to Nigel Lawson, then Chancellor of the 
Exchequer), the Prime Minister herself shared these goals and aspired to create a pension system 
which favoured ‘risking-taking, wealth creation, and diminish[ed] institutionalisation.’43 In light of 
this, the CPS’ proposal envisaged individuals being given the freedom to take direct personal 
control over the investment of their pension savings. This was implicit in the stated aim of 
allowing individuals to ‘run their own personalised pensions as if they were self-employed’ (who 
were already permitted to self-invest their pension savings).44 Such thinking was initially attractive 
to the ministers at the Department of Health and Social Security (DHSS), with the initial Blue 
Paper on ‘personal pensions’ suggesting that stockbroking firms could provide services and 
advice on managing personal investment portfolios.45 In its most radical form, then, a personal 
pension would liberate the individual from a restricted, intermediated, second-hand engagement 
with capitalism by allowing them to prepare for old age by playing the stock-market themselves 
and investing directly in the economy. 
However, the assertion that personal pensions would serve to de-institutionalise 
investment and create a new breed of investor-capitalists was met with a significant degree of 
scepticism from pensions experts and industry representatives. Most scorned the idea that 
individuals would actually take personal control over their investments. Evidence submitted by 
                                                 
41 DHSS Public Inquiry into Provision for Retirement, 24 January 1984, TNA: BN 147/36. 
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the Life Offices Association to a DHSS conference on early leavers suggested that individuals 
were much more likely to delegate the management of a personal pension to an insurance 
company.46 This was reiterated by the ex-chairman of the National Association of Pensions 
Funds, Maurice Oldfield, who informed the Fowler inquiry that portable personal pensions 
would actually ‘bring about a concentration of investment decision-making rather than a 
widening’ since many thousands of occupational funds would be replaced a small group of 
financial institutions managing millions of personal pensions.47 Likewise, in the Treasury, Adam 
Ridley was persuaded that personal pensions would actually only end up giving individuals more 
choice over who managed their money on their behalf, with the plan leaving pensions ‘heavily 
institutionalised if it is achievable at all’.48 The ideal of radical reform to create a nation of active 
investors was thus faced with the constraints of practical reality, with the individual falling short 
of the ideal. 
Faced with severe doubts about the preparedness and ability of individuals to invest their 
pension savings directly, the CPS and its supporters were forced into a change of emphasis. 
Though they still claimed that ‘the individual should be free, if he [sic] wishes, to determine 
absolutely his investment policy for his own portfolio, including personal stock selection’, over 
time Vinson and Chappell were forced to demote the role of investor-capitalist to one that a 
minority of individuals should be able to choose if they were so inclined.49 In giving oral 
evidence to the Fowler inquiry, Chappell stressed that the freedom to ‘determine their 
investment portfolio, including personal stock-selection’ would be a ‘privilege that rather few 
people would want to take care of, but we think it is a privilege that they should have the 
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freedom to develop if they wish to’.50 Any ambitions for ushering in a wider societal shift were 
now downplayed by the CPS. Concerning the mooted proposal that individuals could use their 
pension funds to back small businesses, Chappell asserted that they had ‘never suggested… that 
there would be a whole new breed of street corner capitalists’, but instead ‘only at the fringe’ 
should some people have ‘the opportunity to back the guy next door.’51 When presented with the 
objection that the general public did not have the instinct, inclination, or ability to take full 
control of their pension investments (discussed below), the CPS was pushed into a defensive 
position which emphasised that individuals should simply be free to choose whether they wanted 
to take on such responsibility or not. Thus the CPS was forced to argue that everyone could, 
rather than should, become an investor-capitalist. 
Such emphasis on freedom of choice opened an alternative reform route. If individuals 
would not embrace individual investment en masse, the CPS argued that they should instead be 
given greater freedom of choice over who managed their pension savings for them. An 
alternative proposal by the Central Policy Review Staff, commissioned by No. 10, had recognised 
the limits of self-investment and proposed a ‘personal occupational pension’ (POP) in which 
employers would offer individuals ‘the choice between, say, three individual plans offered by 
financial institutions which are now permitted to solicit investments from the public’.52 The CPS 
went further and argued that ‘a far wider range of institutions, e.g. building societies, banks and 
existing occupational schemes, should be allowed to operate personal portable pensions’ and that 
‘the widest range of authorised managers should be enabled to introduce greater flexibility of 
investment media’.53 Likewise, although other advocates, such as Walter Goldsmith, remained 
committed to the ‘desirable end’ of ‘control by each individual of his own destiny in terms of 
financial resources’, it is clear that he ultimately accepted that out-and-out investment control 
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had to take second-place to the expansion of choice within the pensions market.54 Of course, this 
new emphasis on the primary importance of free choice also had impeccable neoliberal 
ideological credentials, reflecting as it did Hayek’s view that all individuals should be compelled 
to purchase private social insurance.55 
Ultimately the Government’s personal pension policy did not prioritise freedom of 
investment. The Financial Times pensions correspondent, Eric Short, noted that  
 
…though the principle of freedom of choice for employees [had] been maintained, 
the complete freedom envisaged in the original CPS paper has been curtailed… 
there is not complete investment freedom.’56  
 
Instead, all employees were encouraged to opt-out of SERPS or their occupational pension but 
were only permitted to choose ‘the kind of body to invest their pension savings’ on their behalf.57 
Indeed, individual investment freedoms were in fact severely curtailed as the government 
prohibited individuals from using their pension savings in a personal investment portfolio.58 
Moreover, institutions themselves were constrained in how they could invest, and individuals 
were forbidden from putting all their savings in risk-inclined schemes.59 It is evident, therefore, 
that following the conclusion of the Fowler inquiry into pensions, DHSS ministers started to 
prioritise ‘choice’ above all else and the language of ‘choice’ came to dominate the policymaking 
discussion. For example, in October 1985 Fowler informed Thatcher that ‘our objective … [is] 
to increase choice through the option of personal pensions.’60 In a subsequent memorandum for 
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the Cabinet, Fowler asserted that ‘personal pensions are an essential element in our policy of 
improving job mobility and giving people more choice’.61  
The process by which these reforms emerged suggests a much more complex 
relationship between Thatcherism and neoliberalism than is often assumed. Advocates of 
personal pensions appear to have started from a shared diagnosis that individuals needed to be 
brought into a direct relationship with the capitalist system via the investments that would fund 
their old age. However, as they translated this into policy, scepticism as to how far this could be 
achieved in practice enforced a change of priorities - from investment and control, to freedom 
and choice.62 Both of these positions were consonant with neoliberal ideological traditions (the 
former reflecting the ordoliberal concept of vitalpolitik; the latter in keeping with Hayek and the 
Chicago school), but it is only as a result of the frictions and limitations exposed in the 
policymaking process that the latter came to dominate.63 
 
IV 
The same collision between neoliberal theory and practice characterised attitudes to 
individuals’ rationality. As Foucault noted, neoliberalism has at its heart an underlying 
assumption that homo economicus responds rationally to the invisible hand of the market.64 
Individuals ‘become, as it were, entrepreneurs of themselves, shaping their own lives through the 
choices they make among the forms of life available to them’.65 Yet we find in the pension policy 
making of the 1980s a continual tension between the idea of the individual as a rational actor 
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freely making fully-informed decisions about investing for their retirement and an implicit 
recognition of irrationality in that individuals could not be trusted to make the right decisions.  
Writing as early as 1957, in Pensions in a Free Society, Arthur Seldon (then Editorial 
Director at the Institute for Economic Affairs, a think tank identified by Cockett as later being at 
the heart of the neoliberal revolution in the UK) had decried the compulsory enrolment of staff 
into occupational pensions, arguing that individual employees should be allowed to opt out in 
order to exercise free choice.66 Three years later, however, Seldon acknowledged the implicit 
irrationality of individuals in taking ‘too short a view of the future’ and accepted a role for the tax 
system in incentivising retirement savings.67 From the start, therefore, the ‘neoliberal’ individual 
investor/saver was at once a rational exerciser of free choice and an irrational actor in need of 
guidance and (implicitly) of protection by the state to prevent them becoming dependent upon it 
in old age. 
This tension was clearly evident in the Conservatives’ reorientation of policy after 
Thatcher’s election as party leader. For example, the party’s 1976 policy document, The Right 
Approach, clearly expressed an intention to place saving in the hands of the individual in order to 
increase ‘the scope for personal independence and responsible citizenship’.68 ‘The Right 
Approach to Social Policy’ (a planned but never published policy document) also made explicit 
the desire to move from redistribution by the state to individual wealth creation.69  Yet, when we 
examine The Right Approach to the Economy we find a clear tension between the individual 
conceptualised as a rational investor in a capital-owning democracy and the professed need to 
use tax reliefs to encourage saving; and thus a recognition that some individuals would not make 
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rational decisions about provision for their old age and an acceptance of a role for the state in 
shifting their self-interest (and thus shaping their ‘rationality’).70  
In fact, even as The Right Approach praised the virtues of the individual as rational investor 
acting in their own interest, Thatcher was extolling the virtues of occupational pension schemes 
and life insurance funds as vehicles for the accumulation of personal capital. That, however, was 
to praise institutions taking decisions on behalf of workers and savers even as she identified the 
individual’s freedom ‘to make choices’ in a free economy as fundamental to both a free society 
and to what she termed ‘a moral society … not a society where the State is responsible for 
everything, and no one is responsible for the State.’71 Again, therefore, a clear tension can be 
seen, with the individual portrayed as at once rational and irrational, as active and passive, as an 
economic actor in their own right and an actor in need of paternalistic guidance. 
This palette of contradictory conceptualisations of the individual persisted once the party 
entered government. For example, the presumed benefits and limits of individuals’ ability to 
make rational self-interested decisions were especially evident in the CPS’s publications and its 
written evidence to the Fowler enquiry. Yet, much as Personal and Portable Pensions for All intended 
to give all those in employment the option to administer their own pension, it also accepted that 
individual investment would not necessarily be for everyone and that some sort of state 
oversight and incentivisation would be needed to ensure that sufficient contributions were made 
and that they were invested effectively. Certainly the ultimate aim (‘perhaps ahead of its time’) 
was to move to an entirely individualised system in which individuals took their own decisions 
about retirement savings and investment; but even in that ambitious vision (less than ‘rational’) 
individuals were apparently still going to need incentives to save.72 
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One strong objection to the CPS’s radical vision of individuals directly investing their 
retirement savings was doubt about the desire and ability of individual employees to make 
rational investment decisions. The life insurance company Legal and General, an enthusiastic 
proponent of personal pensions, commissioned consumer research into likely demand but this 
served to reveal that only a quarter of employees wanted a ‘do-it-yourself’ alternative to 
occupational pensions. Consequently, the insurer warned the Fowler enquiry that personal 
pensions would be suitable only for a minority of employees (and even then would need both 
continued tax incentivisation and regulation).73 This active minority was to the fore in much 
evidence to that enquiry, which tended to conceptualise the potential PPP investor as at least 
‘reasonably competent’ financially and more often as someone possessing both knowledge and 
initiative. Often those giving evidence implicitly presented that individual either as a business 
owner or, more commonly, as a more educated employee who might be interested in saving for 
retirement on their own account, but via ‘safe’ institutional funds investing predominantly in 
bonds rather than equities. Yet many were sceptical about the degree to which individuals were 
equipped to make such decisions.74 For example, Ken Thomas of the TUC dismissed the idea 
that there was a large reservoir of financially well-informed employees wishing rationally and 
actively to undertake their own pension investment and found it ‘quite laughable to imagine that 
the vast majority of working people of this country – and I am not insulting them – want the 
opportunity to play the stock markets themselves’.75 The Society of Pensions Consultants warned 
that personal pensions were ‘unlikely to be a “wise choice” for individuals’ because ‘given choice 
and lack of understanding many individuals could make decisions they might live to regret’.76 
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Others warned of the potential for misselling (something plainly at odds with the idea of a 
rational and well-informed investor) – the chairman of the National Association of Pension 
Funds, for example, warned that the PPP ‘opens up the prospect of some rich pickings for the 
commission only salesmen who have already been issued with their battle gear’ and Save and 
Prosper warned that ‘people will be victims of dishonest or incompetent salesmen’.77 We should 
therefore understand the CPS’s forced retreat from its most radical policy option as a recognition 
that paternalistic guidance would remain the norm. Although the implied hope was that via the 
provision of PPPs and government tax reliefs on contributions individuals might be nudged 
away from that paternalism, even the CPS had to accept pragmatically the reality of widespread 
individual ‘irrationality’. 
We can clearly see this tension between the individual as a rational being or as someone 
in need of protection from their own irrationality in the response of the Central Policy Review 
Staff (No. 10’s internal think tank) to its brief from the prime minister’s office to produce a 
workable policy on personal pensions.78 Although the CPRS’s proposed policy agenda was 
rapidly repudiated by Thatcher for its startling and politically potentially explosive ambition (she 
plainly feared a potential ‘pensions privatisation’ controversy akin to that created by another 
CPRS memorandum on radical options for welfare state reform just over a month previously - 
which had created consternation in the cabinet and, when subsequently leaked to the Economist, a 
public outcry about the government’s ‘plans to privatise the NHS’) the CPRS’s analysis 
nonetheless captured many of the key tensions between ideology and practical policy.79 The 
fundamental question posed by the CPRS (‘Are people encouraged to be self-reliant and save as 
they think best for their retirement needs, or is the whole system weighed down by the 
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paternalism of the state and corporations?’), signalled its intention to design a system premised 
on freeing the rational individual (not least by abolishing the ‘paternalistic’ SERPS). Yet, the 
CPRS always viewed this ability to make rational decisions as conditional. To ‘encourage a self-
reliant and responsible approach to retirement saving’, it would be necessary both to incentivise 
independence through tax reliefs and to improve individuals’ knowledge.  In the long run, the 
latter would be achieved through ‘better schooling to prepare people for life’s financial 
responsibilities’, but also by simplifying the system and reducing the state and employer 
paternalism that partly created ignorance.80 The individual’s ability rationally to save was 
therefore not seen as axiomatic by the CPRS; it required will and knowledge that must be shaped 
via a complex system of compulsion, incentivisation, and education. 
Thus, when confronted with the reality of existing saving behaviours, the CPRS’s 
proposals for portable occupational pensions accepted the need for paternalistic compulsion to 
counteract suspected irrationality. It was particularly concerned about higher-earning middle 
managers who benefited from SERPS, but were themselves ‘not used to saving significantly for 
retirement’ and faced competing commitments, such as family and home-purchasing, during 
their working lives. ‘Until the habit of saving became much more deeply integrated’, it was not 
likely that ‘this group would save as much for retirement privately as they now do compulsorily 
through pooled schemes’. To resolve this the CPRS suggested that companies might continue to 
enforce a minimum level of saving so that ‘these employees would have the right to choose how 
to save, (i.e. through the company scheme or through a POP), but not whether to save’.81  
The acceptance that many would fall short of the ideal of a rational and perfectly 
informed actor taking active responsibility for the investment of their retirement savings was 
clearly also evident in the later DHSS consultative document. In this, Fowler recognised that 
‘many people will be content to stay in their employer’s scheme, with the advantages that large-
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scale investment and expert management can offer.’82 For those wanting to take up the 
opportunity to take out a personal pension there would not just be fiscal incentives but also a 
requirement to make a minimum level of contributions. Those contributions would be made to 
government-approved pension savings schemes that would operate within a regulatory 
framework (though this would turn out to be inadequate) and there were to be restrictions on 
what types of investment would be eligible. As the DHSS put it, ‘Pension decisions have major 
long-term effects and therefore there must be safeguards for the public’.83 This was to be a world 
of incentivised individual pension savings in pooled funds run by regulated institutions. 
Rationality was thus not taken as a given; it would have to be shaped, but also constrained. 
Although the CPS welcomed the government’s ‘personal pension’ proposals as the first 
step on the way to its desired personalisation of pension wealth, the truth was that in the process 
of reform a substantial reconfiguration had taken place that had required a reconceptualization 
of individual rationality.84 The initial conception of PPPs had been founded on the idea of a 
rational, well-informed and active investor accumulating capital through direct investment in 
British firms; the PPP as actually implemented was founded on a vision of the individual as a 
relatively uninformed and passive saver; someone who was sometimes rational enough to 
recognise the need to save for old age income replacement and prepared to exercise freedom of 
choice within the market place; but also someone reliant on, and happy to defer to, the 
knowledge and investment skills of a financial institution. Individual freedom of choice (shaped 
by compulsion and incentives) in an intermediated and regulated market had triumphed over the 
reconfiguration of British capitalism by an army of active and rational individual investors. 
 
V 
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Entrepreneurialism was central to Thatcherism’s development as a political and 
economic project. Thatcher herself valorised small business owners and the self-employed as 
‘wealth creators’ whose decisions to ‘leave the security of employment’ created the profits and 
jobs vital to Britain’s prosperity.85 In contrast, she portrayed socialists as vindictively attacking 
entrepreneurs, who resisted state intervention and were ‘not the raw material on which to build a 
Socialist society’.86 Moreover, Thatcherites diagnosed Britain’s ‘sickness’ as resulting from a 
deficiency of entrepreneurial risk and investment. The Right Approach to the Economy, for example, 
identified in 1977 a ‘dearth of private risk capital… at the root of many of the small business 
sector's problems’.87 To reverse the habit of living off capital accumulated by past generations, 
Geoffrey Howe, the future Chancellor, promised to ‘restore the legitimacy of getting rich by 
taking risks’.88 Thatcherism thus constructed both its political and economic narratives around 
the entrepreneur’s values and economic utility. 
At the same time, Thatcherism connected the Tory themes of thrift and saving with the 
critique of dependency outlined above. ‘If you value independence and self-reliance, then you 
will practice thrift to achieve them’, Thatcher argued, and her ‘kind of Tory party’ would, 
therefore, encourage saving.89 Brought together as middle Britain’s threatened values, saving and 
entrepreneurialism could be complementary: ‘if both saving and enterprise are penalised’, 
Thatcher warned the 1975 Conservative Women’s Conference, then ‘those who can do most to 
increase the prosperity of the workers will simply take their money and their skills abroad’.90 Yet, 
this common identity and relationship with prosperity hid an underlying tension. 
Entrepreneurialism was praiseworthy precisely because it required individuals to ‘risk the modest 
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savings on which the family would depend in hard times’ in pursuit of independence. From the 
beginning, then, Thatcher’s medicine contained a potentially volatile blend of thrift and risk. 
This tension resurfaced when those advocating personal pensions sought to transform 
individuals into both entrepreneurial investors and prudent savers. The CPS did not simply intend 
to expose individuals to underlying investments, and to the risks they embodied; it intended to 
reshape individuals’ choices into entrepreneurial ones. It proposed, for example, that individuals 
be able to draw upon to 25 percent of their accrued investments as ‘loan-backs’.91 Inability to 
repay these loans would represent a significant risk to an individual's pension. Yet, this added 
risk was seen as justified because making such loans available to ‘those going into self-
employment’ would help ‘the development of new enterprise’, and even those unwilling to start 
new companies could contribute to the entrepreneurial development of existing ones.92 
Individuals might use a proportion of their funds to invest in their employers' companies, for 
instance. Whilst acknowledging that reliance on the same business for employment and savings 
might not be prudent, the CPS was keen to transfer this judgement between prudence and 
entrepreneurial risk onto the individual.93 Moreover, individuals should be free to invest part of 
their PPP in ‘venture situations or management buy-outs’.94 This further introduction of risk was 
justified by reference to the needs of an entrepreneurial society, which were not being met by 
existing capital markets. PPPs could fill a ‘financing gap’ for those opportunities that were too 
small to be of interest to institutional investors. In meeting this need, the CPS viewed PPPs as a 
means to ‘create a new group of capitalist entrepreneurs’. 95  
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However, the CPS also conceptualised its proposals as encouraging thrifty saving.96 The 
increased choice brought about through PPPs would, it argued, motivate individuals to save for 
their old age. A ‘much wider range of investment media’ would ‘increase awareness of savings 
need’ and therefore ‘savings propensity would actually increase, particularly among those 
approaching retirement and whose family commitments are diminishing’.97 It believed 
accordingly that, through personal pensions, ‘virtually all individuals would make adequate 
savings for their old age (as the self-employed currently do); it would mark a return to words 
such as “thrift”’.98 The individual envisaged by the CPS was, therefore, not only a capitalist 
entrepreneur but also a saver who prudently used their freedom to achieve independence.99 
In theory, there need not be a tension between saving for old age and entrepreneurial 
investments. When applied to individuals, though, the prudence implicit in saving could conflict 
with the risks implicit in entrepreneurship. As we have seen, when confronted with critics who 
argued that individuals would not be capable of managing their investments, the CPS reluctantly 
refocussed its plans onto widening choice. This retreat quickened considerably when these critics 
added that individuals’ ‘hyper-cautious’ saving and investment attitudes might mean that 
personal pensions would actually reduce the supply of entrepreneurial capital available.100 If 
individuals were freed to pick investments directly, their caution might lead them to 
disproportionately back established companies or ‘risk-free assets’ over new ventures which 
offered higher returns but which also carried more risk.101 Instead of disputing its critics' 
characterisation of individuals as risk-averse, the CPS fell back on the caveat that ‘the 
overwhelming proportion… would entrust total management of their pension plan to one of the 
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institutions designated’.102 Accordingly, beyond the initial choice of a scheme, it would be 
institutions and their fund managers – those accustomed to risk taking – who implemented 
entrepreneurial investment strategies.103 Concern that individuals would (perhaps prudently) not 
risk their savings to back entrepreneurs without the aid of intermediaries thus ensured that 
consumer choice became the main route to the flexible capital markets neoliberals hoped for, 
rather than the direct actions of millions of entrepreneurial investor-savers. 
Yet, the tension between prudent saving and risk also exposed contradictions within the 
CPS’s claims about the ability of greater competition and choice to better align institutions’ 
investment strategies with the needs of the entrepreneurial economy. On the one hand, the CPS 
argued that the new market created by personal pensions would encourage existing institutions 
and new providers to offer a wider range of products that reflected different levels of risk.104 
Pensions providers would themselves become more entrepreneurial organisations, and, as the 
products they offered embraced more risk, they would fuel entrepreneurial activity in the wider 
economy. On the other hand, when it needed to reassure ministers that people's savings would 
be managed responsibly, the CPS downplayed the market changes that personal pensions would 
bring about. It argued that many existing occupational schemes would set up individual (so-
called unitised) schemes designed for handling personal pensions, and these, the CPS maintained, 
would likely ‘adopt the investment strategies of the main fund’.105 Thus, when necessary, the CPS 
admitted that many personal pensions would be invested according to the very strategies that it 
claimed stymied entrepreneurship. 
Regardless of whether individuals or fund managers selected the underlying assets, 
personal pensions could not offer the certainty of occupational schemes because they were 
inherently riskier, being susceptible to the performance of selected investments, wider market 
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volatility, and inflation. Yet, protection against the latter was a key goal for prudent savers in the 
1980s, and earlier forms of ‘defined contribution’ pensions (i.e. pensions the value of which 
would depend on contributions and investment performance rather than on any defined benefit 
such as a proportion of final salary) were widely condemned for leaving pensioners vulnerable to 
inflation. For all advocates of personal pensions, the 1982 innovation of inflation-proofed 
‘index-linked’ government securities offered a means of overcoming similar objections.106 
However, this solution contradicted the claims made for personal pensions as a motor for 
entrepreneurial activity since the underlying assets were an investment in government debt, not 
in new or expanding businesses. Insofar as personal pensions depended upon ‘index-linked gilts 
to protect against inflation [they did] not increase enterprise’, the Treasury’s advice concluded.107 
Far from encouraging risk-taking, they would encourage the investor ‘to sit back, secure in the 
knowledge that the taxpayer was taking the full risk of inflation-proofing his pension’.108 They 
might even make it harder for entrepreneurs to borrow by weakening the market for risk-bearing 
opportunities.109 Thus, measures designed to mitigate the initial tension between prudent saving 
and risky entrepreneurial investment inadvertently created a further wave of contradictions that 
undermined personal pensions’ ability to act as a spur to entrepreneurial activity.  
This irony was, however, a symptom of the wider tension within the neoliberal concept 
of the individual that critics identified within Chappell and Vinson’s proposals. ‘When it suits his 
case’, A.J White (Principal in the Treasury’s Social Security Division) argued, ‘[Vinson] implies 
the likelihood of a great creative entrepreneurial spirit amongst the newly freed while elsewhere 
he suggests a very cautious approach’.110 Indeed, the Treasury (which feared the cost of tax 
subsidies to personal pensions) used this conflict between entrepreneurship and prudence to 
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expose contradictions within the more limited proposals for greater choice. Ridley, for example, 
argued that, whilst ‘entrepreneurially-minded’ individuals might be able to choose more ‘risk-
orientated’ funds, so long as something akin to the Occupational Pensions Board regulations 
protected pension investments, there would be ‘very little scope for any major increase in risk 
taking by fund managers’.111 Dianna Seammen (an Assistant Secretary in the Treasury’s Social 
Security Division) even turned the aim of entrepreneurialism against the project’s individualising 
premise. Given that collective schemes could pool risk they would logically be able to ‘undertake 
more venture capital investment than an individual saving for retirement’, making ‘greater 
entrepreneurial thrust in pension schemes… a more promising avenue’.112 The tension between 
entrepreneurship and saving was not simply forcing the CPS to trim its ambitions; it allowed its 
opponents within the Treasury to expose a basic incompatibility between its aims. 
It is unsurprising, then, that the government largely abandoned entrepreneurialism as a 
justification for reform. Legislation introduced a measure of portability: anyone changing jobs 
could transfer all their pension rights to a personal pension.113 Yet, excepting a few short 
references to job creation, neither the 1984 Green Paper nor the final policy explicitly connected 
labour mobility and entrepreneurialism.114 Nor did the 1986 legislation include the CPS’s radical 
proposals for individuals to be allowed to invest directly in venture opportunities, management-
buy-outs, their employer’s companies, or in their own businesses (because they were judged to be 
too risky). In fact, even the CPS recalibrated its argument. Its Pensions Privilege (1988) maintained 
that individuals should have direct control over their investments and that this liberation would 
enable them to invest either in their employers’ businesses or in other ventures, such as their 
‘nephew’s newly established software business’.115 However, the claimed benefits of such direct 
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control were now said to lie in the improved performance of businesses with high rates of 
‘employee financial participation’ and in the increased personal freedom to choose riskier 
investments over the diversification recommended by ‘so-called superior wisdom’.116 Indeed, the 
CPS’s earlier claim that personal pensions would kick-start a newly entrepreneurial society was 
now only made implicitly. Thus, unlike arguments for unmediated ownership or individual 
responsibility, which remained central to the personal pensions case after their most radical 
policy expression had fallen away, the entrepreneurial argument for personal pensions was 
allowed to fade. 
 
VI 
The Thatcher era left Britain with a reconfigured pensions system that gave individuals 
the freedom to make their own arrangements by purchasing personal pension products offered 
by financial service companies. Thus, the individual taking out a personal pension was expected 
to act as a consumer whose agency was expressed through free choice within a competitive 
market. These choices were, however, both bounded by the state and institutionally mediated: to 
ensure that individuals acted rationally they were seen to require guidance, protection, and 
incentives provided by the state; and the investment of their pensions savings would be 
undertaken by private pension providers rather than via direct investment. While a minority 
might have been trusted to make the correct decisions on their own, the government’s pension 
legislation reflected its pragmatic acceptance of a population of individuals with varying (and 
generally very low) levels of financial knowledge, entrepreneurial and risk-taking inclination, 
rationality, and propensities to save. 
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The findings presented here clearly reveal an ‘implementation gap’ between what one 
might term ‘Thatcherism in principle’, and ‘Thatcherism in practice’.117 For example, when 
confronted with the actually-existing individual, who was said to be either reluctant or unable to 
make investment decisions alone, the CPS’s plan for unmediated individual access to investment 
markets was rejected. Yet it was not only the ‘crooked timber of humanity’ that constrained the 
Thatcherite agenda. Our analysis has demonstrated that there were fundamental variations and 
contradictions in how the individual under Thatcherism was both conceptualised and expected 
to behave by the various architects of reform. Most notably, the intention to use the pensions 
system in support of entrepreneurialism did not sit easily with the stated intention of 
encouraging individuals to be prudent savers.  
What does the analysis reveal about Thatcherism and its relationship with neoliberalism? 
Should we see the eventual ‘personal pensions’ reforms as a failure to implement ‘true’ 
neoliberalism – as championed by Vinson and Chappell?118 That would be problematic because, 
although the CPS ideal of creating a pension system which produced entrepreneurial, individual 
investor-capitalists was abandoned, its replacement (individual free choice of products from 
multiple providers) accords neatly with Hayek’s proposal for compulsory private insurance in The 
Constitution of Liberty.119 A simple metric which purports to measure the degree of ‘neoliberalism’ 
thus fails to account for the many varieties of neoliberalism. Furthermore, this inconsistency 
both within and between neoliberal thought and practice challenges the tendency for those 
working in the Foucauldian tradition to identify an essential neoliberal subjectivity being formed 
in this period. 
We should, instead, understand Thatcherism as a pathway through the diverse array of 
neoliberal ideas (many, though not all, of which were rooted in the Conservative Party’s 
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intellectual traditions). In the case of ‘personal pensions’, the policymaking process was instigated 
by a unique strain of neoliberalism advocated by the CPS. However, as the original proposals 
were made concrete, some of the initial intentions were jettisoned or downplayed whilst other 
neoliberal ideas (easily available and adaptable) were embraced and/or took on a newfound 
centrality. Sometimes, these shifts in the dominance of particular conceptions of the individual 
arose from a clash of alternative ideas within neoliberal theory or from the confrontation of 
those ideas with reality; but on other occasions shifts arose from the apparent incompatibility of 
different conceptions of the individual. In the working out of those contradictions some original 
aims could survive (for example the desire to break institutional power persisted to an extent 
despite its mechanism switching from direct ownership to consumer choice). Other aims, 
however, most notably the desire to use pensions saving to encourage entrepreneurialism, were 
forced out or downgraded.  
Attempts to introduce ‘personal pensions’ in the 1980s should, therefore, reinforce 
historians’ developing suspicions that we need to move beyond an increasingly sterile debate 
about whether Thatcherism was a personal project; implicit in post-war Conservatism; mere 
Statecraft; or a local expression of a monolithic transnational ideology. We should instead build 
on Sutcliffe-Braithwaite’s recognition that Thatcherism reflected particular strains of 
neoliberalism compatible with Thatcherites’ specific readings of their Conservative inheritance. 
Yet, our analysis also suggests that historians must resist the temptation to characterise the more 
complex ‘ideology’ that actually emerged as either coherent or stable. Nor should we simply see 
it as the haphazard remains of a pre-formed ideology that was constrained by pragmatic 
accommodation with reality. Thatcherism was, in sum, a dynamic, agile political project, whose 
real-world ideological expressions were not so much derived from stable principles as 
constructed ‘in flight’ as politicians, civil servants and stakeholders negotiated the profound 
contradictions they discovered within the underlying neoliberal ideas. There was no coherent, 
pre-formed ‘neoliberal individual’ at the heart of the Thatcherism. If the Thatcher governments’ 
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original intention to was to create a society of entrepreneurial investor capitalists, this was 
destroyed by an accumulation of tensions and inconsistencies within that particular vision. From 
the wreckage of this ideal emerged an alternative conceptualisation of the individual upon which 
was built a reform agenda based on managed consumer choice in a competitive marketplace. 
 
